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"Wall Street frightened by Mexican Moratorium ProposaL" Headlines like this did not appear
for the first time in August 1982 when fmance Minister Jesus Silva Herzog arrived in
Washington to announce that Mexico could not pay the debt payments due that year. In 1933 the
Mexican Delegation at the Intemational American Conference in Montevideo presented a
background paper and proposed a wide ranging resolution to the debt crisis of that period which
they hoped would challenge the "intemational superbankers" (which I labcl the "Mexican
1nitiative"). A retum to that document indicates that many of the proposals on foreign debt for
an equitable and proper resolution of the problem offered in the mid- to late 1980s were
proposed, considered, and then ignored, well bcfore 1982. Not surprisingly, the proposed solutions
also bear a resemblance to those heard today.
Are thcre lcssons to be leamed from the debt crisis of the 1930s that may be relevant to the
current crisis? In this paper I argue that there are substantial similaritics between the crisis of
the 1930s and the crisis of the 1980s. Solutions being proposed now were also proposed then.
Latin American nations then, as now, generally recognized the obligation to pay, arguing
temporary inability, not lack of desire.
But in 1933 Mexico was a 1cader of the movement for the declaration of a continent-wide
moratorium, contrary to its rc1ativc1y compliant patlcm of behavior today. The structure of the
debt-holding and the nature of debt-backing intemational institutions, I will also argue, represents
a further dramatic differcnce. That difference may explain part of the difference in Mexico's
11would like to thank Cynthia Wood, Ricardo Salvatore, Michael D. Robinson, and Michacl
E. Conroy for their helpful commcnts on various drafts of this paper. However, none of the above
are responsibe for any crrors or omissions that may have occurred.
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position. It is clcarly a difference that narrows the scope for Latin American intitiatives and
conditions the prospects for successful resolution of the crisis.
The paper begins with a brief discussion of the international economic and debt situations in
1933, including the structure of the debt (one of the main differences with the current crisis). It
then examines the Mexican debt situation since independence. The background paper written by
Mexican foreign Ministry employee Sanchez Ponton is summarized, and Mexican foreign
Minister Puig's presentation at the conference fol!ows. Tbe paper concludes with reaction to the
proposal and analysis.
The World Economic Situation in the Early 1930s
The worldwide Depression of the early 1930s worsened the structural deilation suffered by
the primary product dependent economies from 1925-1929.2 Excess supply resulting 1'romworld
overproduction led to economy-wide deflation as each sector passed on the burden to other
sectors. Domestic overproduction was dumped on the world market, depressing world prices.
Exchange depreciation in early 1930 exacerbated deflationary pressure, as did increased protection
in industrial country markets. The dollar price lcvcl fel! by 25% between 1928-29 and 1932-
33 deereasing export earnings and thus increasing the real cost of debt service.3 As import
quantities dropped, government tax revenue gencrated from import taxes declincd. Thc long-
term external debt to mcrchandise exports ratio 1'or Latin America as a wholc increased 1'rom
1.5 in 1929 to 2.3 in 1935.4
Exports dec1ined in Latin America (and worldwidc) as a result 01' lower economic activity in
the industrial economies. As prices of commodities continued to 1'al!, and with tight liquidity
aftcr the stock crash 01' September 1929, banks cut credit lines and refused to rol! over
outstanding loans both to commodity purchasers and producers in nced 01' working capital. The
downward spiral appears to have been worse 1'or those countries exporting goods with high
income clasticities. Chile's exports declined over 80% betwcen 1928-29 and 1932-33. Bolivia,
2Por a discussion 01' structural deilation see pages 93-94 of Charles P. Kindlcberger's The
World in Depression, 1929-1939 (Berkeley: University of California Prcss, 1986).
3Carlos P. Diaz-Alcjandro, "Latin America in the 1930s," Latin American in the 1930s (New
York: Sr. Martin's Press, 1984), pp. 17-49, p. 20.
4Ibid., p. 26.
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Cuba, Pero, and Salvador suffered a 70-75% decline in exports in the same periodo Argentina,
Guatemala, and Mexican exports decreased between 65% and 70%, while Brazil, the Dominican
Republic, Haiti, and Nicaragua suffering a decline of 60-65%.5 The purchasing power of exports
for Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Cuba, and Mexico (as a six country total) fell to 52%
of their 1929 value by 1932.6
The 1930's Debt Crisis in Latin America
In December 1933, bonds totalling nearly one billion dollars were technically in default in
Latin America. This number represented over half of the total US dallar bonds of $1.9 billion
outstanding in the region.7 Neither Latin American debtors nor creditors were plcased with the
situation. Under the new Good Neighbor Policy of the Roosevelt Administration, military
intervention by the United States was rulcd out. Several securities holders' committees had been
formed for specific countries, but no general American bondholders' comrnission existed. General
comrnissions did exist in Europe, but as American economic infiuence grew in Latin America
these did not complctely represent the bondholders.
An American effort in Mexico lcd lO the formation of the Intemational Comrnittee of
Bankers on Mexico (ICBM) which first negotiated with the Mexican govemment for the
rescheduling of bond payments in 1922. American bankers also renegotiated the Bolivian debt in
1922. These bankers' committees wielded significant power, and extracted strong conditions and
concessions out of the debtor countries. The plcdging of state revenues, such as customs house
fees and natural resource earnings, was normal. Under the Bolivian agreement, no ncw debt could
5Stephen G. Traintis, Cyclical Changes in Trade Balance of Countries Exporting Primary
Products, 1927-1933, 1976, p. 19; as quoted Kindleberger, Thc World in Depression, 1929-1939,
pp. 188-189.
6Angus Maddison, Two Crises: Latín America and Asia 1929-38 and 1973-83 (Paris:
Devclopment Centre of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 1985), p.
87 (Table A-8).
7Section of Comrnercial Conferenccs, Pan American Union, "Latin American Forcign Debt
Problems," Commercial Pan America, no. 19 (December 1933), pp. 1-2; Willy Feuerlcin and
Elizabeth Hannan, Dollars in Latín America, An Old Prob1cm in a New Setting (New York:
Council on Forcign Rclations, 1941), p. 14. These dcfault figures do not include Mexican bond
payments as those had been renegotiated and they were not technically in default.
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be contracted without the consent of the bankers. ObviousJy, other counLries wcre noL anxious to
enter into these types of arrangemenLs.8
The nature of the debt contribuLed to the difficuJty in resoJving the situation. Loans were
arranged by investment banks through the issuance of bonds. These bonds were then soJd to the
pubJic in the U.S., with the banks genera]]y se]]ing most of them off. Thus their interest Jasted
onJy until they transfered the obJigation to others. They co]]ected their fees for the issuance and
saJe and did not concern themseJves with the repayment and retirement of the bonds. Latin
American bonds issucd in the 1920's yieJded high rates of return (typica]]y 6-8 %) in contrast
with comparabJc domestic retums (in the 5% range).9
The defauJts took many forms. Somc countries, such as Uruguay, dcposited the nationaJ
currency equivaJcnt of the payment in an account, and aLtempLed LOservice the debt whenever
do]]ars were avaiJabJc. OLhers, such as BoJivia, nOLed their intent to pay but cited Jack of abiJity
and simpJy stoppcd a]] payments. Most Jargcr countries, such as Brazil and CoJumbia, issued
internaJ funding bonds to cover intcrest payments, but the procceds werc usua]]y insufficicnt to
tota]]y cover the contracLuaJ paymenLs. Argcntinc nationaJ debt never went into defau1t, aJLhough
ccrtain municipaJities and provinces within Argentina did. Evcn the Dominican RcpubJic, under
U .S. protectorship, fe]] behind in sinking fund paymcnts for a whiJe.
Thc do]]ar bonds usua]]y werc conLractua]]y guaranLeed in three regards: they wouJd be repaid
In do]]ars, the do]]ars wouJd be of a certain goJd value, and thc paymcnts wouJd come from
pJcdged revenues. When the U.S. abrogated the goJd cJause ensuring payment of U.S. bonds in
goJd dolJars in June 1933, Lhc rest of the worId followcd. Thc U.S. provided a sLrong dcfense
for its "defau!t": the right of a sovereign govemment LOact in its nationaJ inLcrest, and the righL
of thc crediLor to no more Lhan Lhe return of purchasing power equaJ to the amount he JenL.
80n Mexico see Edgar TurJington, Mexico and I-Ier Foreign Creditors (New York: CoJumbia
Univcrsity Press, 1930) and Robert Freeman SmiLh, The United States and Mexico: RevoJutionary
NationaJism in Mexico, 1916-1932 (Chicago: Thc University of Chicago Prcss, 1977. On BoJivia
see the StifcJ-NicoJas Investment Company, Spencer Trask and Co., and EquitabJc Trust Company
of New York's 30 JuJy 1923 Memorandum ancl Margaret AJcxandcr Marsh's The Bankcrs in
Bolivia (New York: Vanguard Press, 1928).
9Study Group of Members of the RoyaJ Institute of InLernationaJ Affairs, The Problem of
IntemationaJ Investment 1937 (New York: AuguSLsM. KelJey, BookseJ1cr, ReprinLs of EconOnllC
CJassics, 1965), p. 170.
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Although no outright repudiation oecurred, the situation was critical. Yet no international
settlcment meehanism existed.
In the U.S. a revolt against farm mortgages resulted from the eollapse
of farm priees. In the Latin American countries, there was not positive
help for debtors in the shape of parity payments from an international
AAA; no competant legal body existed which could declare moratoria or
put sovereign states through bankruptcy proceedings. Lacking new loans
to pay on old debts, default seemed the only way out. Moreover, just as
government loans to American farmers and other forms of relief had a
political as well as an economic aspect, so certain Latin American
governments discovered that non-payment of their foreign debt was good
political capital. The phrase "debt slavery" expressed the popular attitude
toward foreign loans.lo
The Seventh lnternational American Conference, a Pan American Union sponsored event heId
every four years, was held in Montevideo in December 1933. The Mexican dc1egation hoped to
add the topic of external debt and credit to the already established official agenda. lts efforts,
labelcd the Mexican lnitiative, attracted considerable attention. Discussion of this Initiative will
constitute the rest of this paper. rirst the background of Mexican debt will be prescnted,
followed by the presentation of the lnitiative and responses to it.
The Mexican Debt Situation
Mexico 's record of payment on foreign debt was not good. After issuing its first loan in
1824, payments had a1ready fallen behind schedule by 1827. for the next sixty years
readjustment plan followed non-payment followed fmther rcadjustment plans. President Juarez
in 1867 repudiated the loans contracted by Maxirnilian in 1864 and 1865 as well as the
assignmcnts of customs duties. By the time Profirio Diaz renegotiated the external debt and
attempted to reorganize the financia1 structure in 1886, many defaults and partial repudiations
had occurred.
With each ncw round of debt renegotiations, bondholders desired additional security for
newly perceived increased risk and as compensation for lost revenues. Provisions for security
of repayment through the plcdge of customs duties and revenues were often included in the
original loan documents, with specific customs houses or regions (sueh as those on the Gulf of
IOFeuer1cinand Hannan, Dollars in Latin America, An 01d Prob1cm in a New Setting, p. 23.
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Mexico) cited. The early foreign crediLors were predominantly British. When payments feJl
behind, bondholders appealcd to their respective governments to protect their rights under the loan
agreements. The British government's first response was that His Majesty's Government was not
responsible at a]J for the situation and had no right to interfere in this priva te matter. The British
officials in Mexico could do no more than offcr their offices for proper representations made
to the Mexkan govemment by the bondholders themselves. In 1830 a Committee of Mexican
Bondholders was organized in London. The Committee was more successful than the individual
bondholders in cliciting support from the Govemment. Afier the Committee's first appeal to the
British Govemment, the forcjgn Office instructed its representatives in Mexico to support the
claims of these British subjects, and,
... authorized the British vice consuls at Yeracruz and Tampico to
undertake the duty of receiving from the Mexican authorities, and
transmitting to England, such sums of money as might be set apa11 at the
ports mentioned for the payment of the dividends due to the holders of
the bonds.ll
Thus began the long history of the attempts of bondholders' associations to influencc thcir
governrnents, with angry demands madc by the bondholders and ambiguous instructions sent to
the representatives 01' these governments in Mexico.
Bondholders organizations grew ID influence as foreign lending increased worldwide. The
Corporation of foreign Bondholders was formed London in 1868 and the Association Nationalc
des Porteurs francais de Yaleurs Mobilieres was organized in Paris in 1899. Other smaller
groups were formed as we]J, but these two represented the majority of the bondholders, with the
Corporation of foreign Bondholders the most vocal and powerful both in negotiations with
bondholders and innuence on its governmcnt. Although the political and economic influence of
the United Statcs increascd over the years, intensifying during WWl, an American bondholders
association did not exist; neither did a Mexican specific committee.
Up until WWI, these bondholders organizations did not usually have close ties with thcir
governments. In 1919, however, the governments of france, Great Britain, and thc United States
approved the organization of an Intemational Committee of Bankers on Mexico (ICBM). Citizens
llEdgar Turlington, Mexico and Her Forciu-n Creditors, p. 59.
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of these countries owned over two-thirds of a11government and railway bonds of Mexico.12 The
purpose of the ICBM was to study the Mexican situatíon to ascertain what policy would best
assure timcly servícing of bond payments. Its government backing and international nature
a110wed it to exert considerable infiuence on the Mexican government in its negotations.13
Interna11y at this time, Mexico was experiencing political upheaval. Porfirio Diaz had left a
heavy debt burden and expenses for the strugglc to overthrow him were added to the public debt
by President Madero. Shortly after Victoriano Huerta ousted Madero, the Mexican government
contracted a new loan for L16 million despite disagreement of the opposition Carranza party.
The loan was a ten year maturity at 6%, signed on June 8, 1913. Lack of revenue domestically
and unavailability of further foreign loans as a result of official American opposition forccd
Huerta 10 declare a suspension of debt service on both internal and external public debt on
December 17, 1913. Mexico was then forced to utilize internal credit. This period lasted until
1921 when a ncw government, under the direction of Alvaro Obregon, issued a statement of
intent to return to contracted payments and began earnest negotiations with the ICBM.
The ICBM-Mexico negotiations resulted in the de la Huerta-Lamont Agreement of June 16,
1922. Adolfo de la Huerta was Obregon's Minister of finance. Thomas W. Lamont was the
chairman of the ICBM, and a representative of the powerful banking fum of J.P. Morgan & Co.
The Agreement pledged the entire proceeds of the oil export tax, 10% of the gross revenues of
the National Railways of Mexico (NRM -- whosc guaranteed debt was included in the
Agreement), and the entire net operating pro[its of NRM to the amortization fundo The
Agreement also converted all external debt, some of which had been in pounds sterling, into
dollar debt. Within ayear of signing of the agreement, Mexico was once again not meeting its
obligations. Over the next [ew years several [urther agreements were signed, with Mexico
falling out of compliance shortly a[terwards in each case. As a result of these ongoing
negotiations, Mexico was accutely aware of the presence and infiuence of the foreign bankers.
12Ibid., p. 12.
13Theinteresting conditions lcading to the formation of the ICBM are told in Robert Freeman
Smith's The United States and Mexico: Revolutionary Nationalism in Mexico, 1916-1932
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1969(?)).
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These negotiations lasted long, with many members of the ICBM believing that the Mexican
government could resume complete debt service payments if it were more frugal domestically.
The following exchange between finance Minister de la Huerta and a french member of the
committee not only reflects the differences between the sides in 1922, but also foreshadows
similar debates in the 1980s:
Mr. de la Huerta: Above a11Mexico must live first. .., If a family is
in financial straits bread and milk should be the first consideration and
then after that will come the creditors.
Mr. Chevalier: The remedy is to cut down expenses which are not
essential.
Mr. de la Huerta: That has already been done.
Mr. Chevalier: What do you understand then by the phrase of "full
recognition of contracts?"
Mr. de la Huerta: The family has not failed to recognize the debts
of the grocer.14
Background Studv to the Initiative: Sanchez Ponton's Views on Debt
Under the auspices of the Ministry of foreign Relations, Luis Sanchez Ponton wrote Las
Deudas Exteriores: Principios Applicablcs a Su Revision V Pago as a background paper on the
proposed additional topics of external debt and credit for the lnternational American Conference
to be he Id in Montevideo.
The officially approved agenda was not as wide in scope as Mexico had wanted it to be, and
Mexico hoped to include several additional topics on cconomics. Presented as the Mcxican
contribution to the topic, it appears that Mexico had hoped that other countries would prepare
similar studies with their views on the subject. The rest of this section is devoted to a summary
of the background paper in which Sanchez Ponton examines the historical devclopment and nature
of credil before presenting the Mexican proposal for discussion of a moratorium. Thus the
section rcflects his interpretation of the Mexican debt siluation, and is written from his point of
view. He stresses that il is not possiblc to study debt without analyzing its links to the entire
economic structure.
According to Sanchez Ponton, the origin of debt is linked 10 commercial development, but
once contracted acquires a life of its own until it is paid off. Experience has shown however, that
14Smith, The United States and Mexico: Revo]utionary Nationalism in Mexico, 1916-1932,
p. 210, quoting Lamont's personal papers.
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debt continues ta grow as borrowers contract more loans to pay off existing debt, contributing
to its persistent growth. The function of banks is to utilize the surplus which would otherwise
remain unproductive.
He further argues that one of the important links between debt and the economy as a whole
is through the mechanism of repayment. Debt is normally a contractual obligation. The contract
detennines a definitc tenn according to which repayment will takc place. This requires a
monetary system which assures that the obligor will have the means of repayment to satisfy the
creditors, implying a certain security of value of money.
Sanchez Ponton states that wealth, profit, savings, and spending grow parallel to debt so that
only in "isolated cases of abuse"IS would debt grow faster than these other factors which
provide means of repayment. Thus when repayment is impossible it is a sign of serious problems
in the economy as a whole. Inopportune demands by a creditor injure the creditor himself as well
as the debtor, worsening the situation and possibly provoking bankruptcy or repudiation.
A fundamental problcm of the banking system for Sanchez Ponto n is that it fulfills a
social function but is ron for private good.
The problem with the system stems, however, from the fact that the
banks and the interests which direct them, those which generally
predominate in the banking system, work in a way such that the money
of the depositors does not go to where they would like it to go, but rather
benefits the social sector and interests of the bank directors.16
Unfortunatcly, while it would better for the govemment to ron the banks in the public interest,
the job requires experience the public ofTicials lack. On the intemational lcvcl, while at times
certain banks appear to be instruments of "dollar diplomacy" or "financial imperialism," at other
times they appear to be the determining factors of a govemmental policy which protects their
interests.
ISLuis Sanchez Pontan, Del Mexico Actual: Las Deudas Exteriores: Principios Aplicables a
Su Revision y Pago (Mexico: La Secretaria de Relaciones Exteriores, 1934), p. 15.
16Ibid., p. 20.
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Sanchez Ponton notes that the instabiliLy 01' currency prevents access to credit by [irms
which need it to carry on day-to-day business. Whilc governments can attempt to resolve this
problem internally, they are relatively powerless with international credit because of the scarciLy
of gold in relation to the volume of debt. This situation is exacerbated by the slowdown in
worldwide cornmerce, preventing many countries from meeting their debt scrvicing obligations.
Any discussion or plan to deal with the debt problcm must also address thcse wider topics.
He argues that strictly budgetary restrictions have forced the suspenslOn of external debt
servicing as export carnings have failed to generate sufficient public revenues. If an alternative
to gold is not adopted, no alternative to reinvestment as a means of payment will be possible,
"... that is to say, the obligation imposed on the crediLors of investing in businesses of the debtor
country a part or the total amount of all payments due."17
Sanchez Ponton points out that although a loan may be legally perfect, it remains subject to
an implicit condition n the material possibility of meeting it. No one is obligated to do the
impossible. A prablcm with the agreements negotiated with the bankers' cornmittees on the
foreign debt is that these are based on possibilities; they cannot o[[er guarantees on future
possibilities as they are not based on actual facts. In addition, a country cannot pay its debts if
it is not allowed to trade freely, for examplc, if tariffs prevent it fram gaining access to
markets for US dollar earnings.
He goes on to say that all of America should be proud of Ambassador Drago's thesis of
renunciation of military intervention for the collection of sovereign debt. Luis M. Drago was the
Argentine Minister of foreign Relations in 1902. He wrote a lctter dated December 29, 1902 to
the Argentine Ambassador in Washington commenting on the situation in Venezuela where
Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom were rumbling about non-payment of debt and
contemplating some kind of military intervention. The Drago Doctrine states:
The acknowledgement of the debt, the payment of it in its entirety, can
and must be made by the nation without diminution of its inherent rights
as a sovereign entity, but the surnmary and immediate collection at a given
moment, by means of force, would occasion nothing lcss than the ruin
17Ibid., p. 30.
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of the weakest nations and the absorption of their Govemments, together
with all the functions inherent in them, by the mighty of the earth.18
In order to resolve legal disputes without the use of force, an intemational organization should
be established 10 act as an intermediary in commercial and financial transactions.
In conclusion, Sanchez Ponton presents the propositions the Mexican delegation wishes to
present to the conference:
1. Affirmation of respect for legal contracts and non-repudiation of legitimate debt.
2. Reenforcement of the Drago Doctrine to renounce all economie as well as military
pressure.
3. Formation of a creditors' organization which could enter into direct negotiations
with debtors.
4. Adoption of a general capacity to pay principle which would be incorporated in
all debt agreements. It would be established taking into account the cornmercial
balance and price levcls.
5. Adoption of a principIe of capitalization of payments destined to amortize public
debt in cases where no intemational means of payment exist.
6. Negotiation of a cornmon moratorium.
Puig's Memo
Several months prior to the Montevideo Conference, Mexican foreign Minister Puig
circulated a version of the Mexican proposal to the representatives of various other govemments
to get reactions. The Mexicans hoped this document would stimulate enough interest to warrant
the inclusion of the Mexican program on the o[[icial agenda. The memorandum, dated September
14, 1933, speaks in broad terms of economic reform on an intemational scale. Weak countries
caught in the wcb of Wall Street's "bankers' commillees" must be givcn the same opportunities
as strong countries to declare moratoria.
It does not seem right that the countries with greater economic
independence or political strength have madc or do make decisions which
they choose with respect to the moratoria, whilc the weak countries,
fearing the "bankers' committees" have to continue squeezing their rachitic
18Luis M. Drago, Cobro Coercitivo de Deudas Publicas (Buenos Aires: Coni Hermanos,
Editores, 1906), p. 12; English translation in Max Winkler, Investments of United States Capital
in Latin America (Boston: World Peace Foundation, 1928), p. 57.
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budgets thus practically submerging their own peop1e and sowing the seed
of discontent and of social dissolution.19
The Con ference
Puig opened his official presentation 10 the Cornrnittee on Initiatives on December 5 by
stating that he was openly provoking the interests of the superbankers. The superbankers. often
acting in disrespect of law and nations. handIe credit astutely as long as they are supported by
a structure of popular institutions (including these same nation-states they so often disrespect).
The science of economics contributes to this structure. People follow it without really
understanding it. cspecially the mechanism of credit. In Latin America it is often thought "that
the one who receives credit receives a favor, to be the object of a loan is to be the beneficiary
of a splendid manifestation of beneficence..."20
The blame for the debt probIem was not placed on the ordinary bankers, the banking
profession, or even capitalism itself.
We are attacking. rather, the perverted Iegal forms, the twisted ideas, the
distortion of concepts, of responsibility, and of function which debase the
orthodox economic science, which "big business" has been able to convert
inlO principIes, treaties and laws.21
It is the "international superbankers" who Puig blamed, claiming that they did not suffer at
all in the depression. These bankers "fleeced" peop1c of hard earned savings by sellings them
bonds, with the bankers earning a high rate of profit.
Puig felt that useful results carne about as a result of the mere announcement of the
Mexican position. The moratorium of six to ten years was proposed in order to better assure
future payments to bondholders and better economic futures for Latin American countries in
general. The discussion should move beyond the external debt situation to the idea of credit. A
new legal and philosophical concept of credit itsclf needed to be established.
19Seventh International Conference oe American States: Minutes and Antecedents




Puig argued that in order to repay old debts, nations must contract ncw debt, further fueling
the cyclc of compound interest. The supcrbankcrs have pursucd thcir own interest and concealcd
the truth from the pcople to whom thcy were sclling these bonds, not analyzing the economic
possibilities for the regular amortization of these loans and bonds. They are all optimistic when
a loan or bond is floatcd in thcir peddling cfforts. Thcy mcrely necd to unload the bonds, not
worry about thcir amortization.
Thereaftcr, forced by the nccessity to amortize thcir debts, our people
may be obliged to put all kinds of restrictions on international commerce,
leading a miserable life, that they may be saved, that they may bear up
under the depression thus aggravated and often intensificd by the
insufficiency of our metal. And whcn we do not pay our debts, the
reasons are not examined, the moral causes are not seen, and we are
unfaithful to our sacred pledges.22
The resolutions thcmselves, distributcd to all dclcgates and includcd in the Minutes and
Antecedents, incorporate Sanchez Pon ton' s concluding points.
The first to respond to DI. Puig was U.S. Secrctary of State Cardell Hull. He began by
stating that neither he nor the U.S. government could speak on behalf of either group in the
external dcbt story as presented, as the U.S. Government was not a creditor to any of the Latin
American states. furthcrmore, intemational bankers as a whole were not supporters of the
Roosevelt administration. His analysis of thc situation was descriptive, not attempting to place
blame.
What has happened in the United States with regard to these debts is the
following: the international bankers and distributing houses have placed
loans both in the United States and abroad for large amounts, and after
having placed these loans these houses have passed on the respective
bonds to private citizens: farmers, laborcrs, business men, in such a way
that it can be said, comparatively, that the chief amount of the debts is
not in the possession of thc bankers but in the possession of private
individuals. The bankcrs, after having takcn their profits, ceased to concern
themselves about thcse loans and went about their ordinary business.23
The U.S. govemment was sponsoring the formation of an indepcndcnt Bondholder Commission




negotiate in a fair manner wilh the debtor. This commission was not to be connected wilh the
federal Govemmenl or lhe inlemational bankers. In addition, the U.S. Congress had passed a law
making the inlemational bankers and dislribuling houses responsiblc for negligence for lhe
losses incurred by individuals bolh intemally and in forcign markels.
The next to respond was Saavedra Lamas, the head 01'the Argentine Delcgation. Bis reaction
was the strongest and most critical of all of the responses to the Mexican initiative. Bis response
criticized the Mexicans on two lcvels. The first was on the nature of the lntemational American
Confcrence. Lamas stated that such a meeting had never dealt with financial issues and lhat a
declaration of anything resembling a moratorium would be tantamount to a collective Ministry
of finance for all America. The charter of the Pan American Union would need to be changed
for the adoption of such a motion to be in order. AIso, Pan Americanism should not destroy
financial autonomy. On the second and more substantive level, Argentina slresscd that each
counlry had its own situation, and that financial problcms di!lcred from country to counlry.
Upon what facls would we be able to base the following: "We find
oursclves in an unbearablc siluation in which our poor republics are
struggling to 1'ace lhe difficulties that prevent betler conditions on the
peoplc, and sacrificing their very lives by imposing upon lhemsclves taxes
to be aecepled palriotically extracting from lheir very vilals the resources
with which to pay 1'oreign credilors and mainlain the credit 01'the nation
and we decreed in a Pan American Union lhat all these sacrifices are
uselcss and should be substiluted wilh a uniform moratorium." Could we
say thal?24
A moralorium would deslroy lhe credit 01' those countries which had worked hard to mainlain it,
Lamas argucd.
Puig responded by slating that Mexico was only asking for a discussion 01' lhe topies, thus
Argent ina could oppose only the approprialeness of lhe topie. Discussions on lhe lopic ilsclf
should wail unlil lhe appropriate eommiUee took lhe matter up, not wilhin the Iniliatives
COl11mittee whieh merely acled as lhe Sleering Commiltee. Puig added,
Ir, lhen, lhe objeclion is lhe possibilily of hurting feelings by merely
announeing for discussion lhe aeceptance of a list of lopics in which
there appears the appalling word which produees calaclysms and is ealled
"moralorium," the word whieh we dare not pronounce but which occupies
all our thoughts wilh cerlain falalily, bolh here in Latin America and in
Europe; the word responding to and connecling the very decds done in the
24Ibid., p. 166.
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financial world -- if that word is harmful, Mexieo will be glad to
withdraw it.25
Lamas countered by proposing that a subcommitee be established to study the issue and
report back to the Committce as a whole within thrce days. Brazil and Chile gave supporting
speeches for the Argentine proposal while Cuba supported Mexico's original proposal. The
Argentine proposal was adopted. The subcommittee was comprised of the delegates from
Argentina, the United States, Columbia, Mexieo, and Brazil.
The Subcornmittee recornmended that a High Cornmittee on Intemational fmance be created
to discuss this worthy topie. A conference convening this Cornmittee was to be held as soon as
possible in Santiago or Buenos Aires.
Although that was the end of dicussion of the moratorium topie per se, related topies were
discussed in the Economies Cornmittee, and the Mexican proposal did arise from time to time.
J. Cipriano Castro, the representative from El Salvador noted his appreciation of the Mexiean
proposal, stating,
Sooner or later, we too, with the other Latin American countries must
suspend the payment of debts. And here I see clearly that the matter of
debts someday must be heard in a Congress. That time will not be later
than the time when debtor countries collectively, already in moratorium,
are not able to permit Delcgates who gather to hold meetings any
alternative except to sanction what has already been done by the nations.26
Another strong supporter of the discussion of the extemal debt situation was fe1ipe Barreda
Laos, the Peruvian delega te. He presented a report supporting the creation of an Intemational
American Bank which would improve the fair financing altematives for Latin America and
defend it against abuses of guarantees and concessions. Addressing the Economics CornmiUee
under the heading "Reorganization of the Intemational System of Credit and Currency," he stated:
The system for contracting large foreign credit operations in Latin
America would greatIy improve ir this intemational economie and
financial institution which we are proposing could be in a position of




conscquences of a reactionary and harrnful system ol' international
financing, thc efficacious and powerful aid of thc credit of the associated
American countries inslead ol' the burdensome and deplorable conditions
at present subsisting.27
The Pcruvians presenled two proposals on external debt. Both were referred to the Confcrence
to be heId in Santiago or Buenos Aires. One recommended that confidence be restored to the
credit system by the prompt negotiation ol' a satisfactory solution to the external debt problcm.
The other went more to the core of the problem:
Be it resolved: that the financing of forcign loans should be done taking
into consideration a11 factors which contribute to a debtor State's credit,
prohibiting the pledging of specific public revenues as guarantees and
national concessions for commercial use and privilege that encourage the
irnmoderate use of external credit, committing the capacity and economic
and financial autonomy of the debtor nations.28
Overall, the excitement about the discussion of the external debt problem was di[fllscd
successfully by the Argentine sponsored proposal to postpone discussion of the matter to its own
conference.
Press Reaction
Discussion ol' the dcbt situation in the Latin American press, especially that of Mexico,
preceded the opening of the Conference. La Opinion, a leftist newspaper in Santiago Chile
suggested in its December 3 edition that the Chilean delegation present a program including a
condemnation of the debts and bonds issued in the United States "on behalf of' the Latin
American countries and demanding the publication of an official declaration of non-intervention
by the United States.29
Prior to the opening of the Con[erence in Montevideo, the Peruvian delegate felipe Barreda
Laos made a presentation aimed at the press, proposing direct negotiations between debtors and
creditors and a definitive declaration of principles regulating future debt contraction. These
27Ibid., p. 51.
28Ibid., p. 69.
29Excelsior, 4 December 1933.
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principIes should ward against the "genio prestamista" where creditors gam rights to fiscal
revenues oI' Latin American states.30
The press reports on the discussion in the Conference either were straight news reports on
what was happening or analyses of the Hull-Puig-Lamas discussions. The latter were substantive
in some cases and more personal in others. In addition, there was considerable discussion about
the ncw trend in U.S. relations with Latin America.
The New York Times wrotc of a "stonny" session under the headline "ABC Group Shelves
Mexican Debt Plan" with a subtitlc of "Hull Avoids Discussion oI' the Moratorium Proposed at
Pan-American Parlcy -- Puig Offers to Drop It -- Cuban Delegate, However, lnsists He Will
Press Issue at Montevideo." Harold B. Hinton, the correspondent, wrote,
The Secretary of State's long political experience told him Mexico was
unlikely to get the necessary two-thirds vote, so he adopted the most
conciliatory attitude possible, lcaving the Latin Americans to bear the
brunt of the opposition.31
La Nacion, published in Buenos Aires, mentioned that Puig's prescntation changed the nature
of the Conference although it was obvious that the proposal would not be approved.
It has becn seen that the Mexican proposal is not in an environment which
would allow it to prosper. The high production countries with market
power prefer to manage their debts without mixing themselves up with
those who need the hclp oI' the American Community, rcsolving their
difficulties with Bilateral Treaties and not wanting to incorporate
themselves into a group which would diminish their stature and prestige
abroad. The Mexican proposal was buried in a Subcommittee, probably
to resurI'ace in an evasive report.32
The opposite view was presented in an editorial in the Digesto Latinoamericano of Panama.
lt stated that the ideas that Argentina, Brazil, and Chile collaborated with the US to counter the
Mexican proposal and that the planned conference in Santiago was merely a pretty funeral for
the proposal was a sign of Latin paranoia. This newspaper felt that the US, in the person oí'
30La Prensa, 4 December 1933.
31The New York Times, 6 December 1933.
32La Nacion, 6 December 1933, reprinted in Memoria General y Actuacion de la Delegacion
de Mexico (Mexico: La Secretaria Relaciones Exteriores, 1934), 3: 280-281.
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Secretary Hull, was sincere in its desire to discuss the debt situation once things settlcd down in
the US 's period of experimentation.33
Puig was hailcd as a hero in several artic1cs. Domingo Melfi, an Associate Editor of La
Nacion of Buenos Aires, wrote on "Mr. Hull y el Senor Puig Casauranc." The article gave his
impressions of the Montevideo Conference, especially the reaction of the crowd to these two
men. He lamented that no one listened to speakers from small countries, while everyone, even
the usher, strained to hear Hull's monotonous voice. Puig is presented as the opposite of Hull,
representing humanity and the voice of rebellion.34 Puig was also hailcd as a spirit calling for
a radical social and economic transformation by Vanguardia of Rio de Janeiro, which reported
on the rumors in New York that the Montevideo Conference was trying to destroy Wall Street,
but noted that the superbankers had the power so would not have to worry: sooner or later,
however, reform of the system would come, and Mexico would be remembered for its
intrepidness and the elegance and energy of Puig.35
Whv Mexico?
The Mexican Revolution took a strong vocal stand against foreign capital, yet Mexico was
still subject to the perceived tyranny of the ICBM (although even under its many times
renegotiated agreements, it was still habitually in default). It viewed itsclf as the conscience of
Latin America, speaking for the weak nations which could not voice these heretical thoughts
because of the power which the criticized had over them. Mexico believed that the power of the
banker's committees was an affront to its sovereignty, and that the Latin debtors should jointly
rebel against these commiLtees. The lack of legal framework for resolving such problems
needcd to be remedied, so that non-partisan mediaLors could work towards fair sett1cmcnts. The
Mexicans stressed that they didn 't want to injure the bondholders, insLead directing their wrath
towards the bankers who earned a tidy profit on the sale of the bonds and then washed their
hands of the matter.
33Digesto Latinoamericano, 29 January 1934, reprinted in Memoria General (Mexico), 3:427-
428.
34LaNacion, 17 December 1933, reprinted in Memoria General (Mexico), 3:283-287.
35Vanguardia, 30 April 1934, reprinted in Memoria General (Mexico), 3:325-327.
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Mexico beIieved that the matter of debt and credit shouId be discussed in both phiIosophicaI
and practicaI terms given the situation in Latin America. It feIt that Argentina's objections to
discussion of the topic were compIeteIy ridiculous. Argentina, on the other hand, did not want
its good name and painf ully acquired credit standing tarnished through association with any type
of uniform moratorium. In addition, the Argentines still followed the Iead of Great Britain. The
Americans who financed 71 % of Mexico's externaI long term public debt were seen as much
more flexible than the British who dominated Argentine commerce and finance. The British
financed 67% of Argentine external long term public debt (1935 figures).36 The Argentines
formalized their relationship with EngIand with the signing of the Roca-Runciman Pact in 1933,
ensuring special status for British impofts in Argentina and continued debt payments.
The tarnishing of image argument also seemed to be important to Brazil and Chile. However,
both countries had payments problems and, once negotiations were underway, were
non-conciliatory. Their negotiations were the most protracted of all the Latin American countries,
as well as being the most favorable to the debtoI.37
Good Neighbor Policy or not, the U.S. was stilI the power of the region, and the smaller
nations were afraid not to follow its Iead. Whatever the of[icial announcements, the US
government did not take a non-biased stance on the revolutionary activity in Cuba at the time the
con[erence was meeting. In addition, its interventionist history was lengendary in Latin America.
Could the US position have changed that much? Secretary Hull had announced the sponsorship
of the U.S. government for the [ormation of a bondholders cornmission which was to be
"fonned of the most honest and disinterested men that could be found in the country."38 This
was similar, in principIe, to one of the Mexican propositions. However, it was a far cry from
the in depth philosophical discussion of credit which the Mexican had hopcd foI.
Real discussion of external debt and credit was postponed until the "to be held" conference
in Santiago. The con[erence was never held.
36United Nations Econornic Commission for Latin America, ExternaI Financing m Latin
America (New York: United Nations, 1965), p. 28.
37SeeMariIyn E. SkiIes, Latín American International Loan DefauIts in the 1930s: Lessons
for the 1980s? (New York: Federal Reserve Bank of New York), April 1988; and Foreign
Bondholders' Protective Council AnnuaI ReDort' s, 1934, 1935, 1936, 1937, 1938, 1940, 1940-
1944.
38Sevcnth Internationa] Confercnce of American States: Minutes and Antecedents, 3: 162.
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Why Mexico then, but not now? Several possibIe hypotheses may be put forth. The obvious
difference in the structure of debt holding and inlemational instilutions supporting those holding
debt has been explored in this papeL 1 conclude thal these differences offer one compe11ing
explanation. The intemational credilors present a rclativcly unified negotiating force with which
Mexico, like a11 debtor counlries, must deal. In 1933, in contrast, bondholder groups were
disorganized, wilh the ICBM the exception ralher than the rule. Today, the position of the
creditor groups is strenglhed by the international financial institutions such as the IMF, which
did not exist in the 1930s.
Additional possibilities which 1 believe will offer further insighl, and which 1 am
investigating in my current research include domestic economic and political changes within
Mexico (Le., the current ascendence of economic and political groups whose intereSls lie within
the international political economy ralher than with a domestica11y oriented focus prevalcnt
during the early 1940s); and changes wilhin lhe economic and political rclationship between
Mexico and the United Slates, itself a result of domestic changes in bOlh countries and the
international environment.
Conclusion
What does this debate tell us lhat is useful in analyzing the current debt crisis? To start with,
many of the underlying causes of the two crises are similar: heavy compelition among bankers
for the business, lowering of credit slandards, excessive borrowing, unfavorab1c terms of trade,
lack of access lO markets for Latin American exports, high cost of credit (interest rates and
commissions), and recession in the devcloped counlries. More importantly for the purposes of
this paper, we see that many of the solutions being proposed today have been mentioned before.
These include: adoption of a general capacily-to-pay principIe taking inlo account trade balances
and relative prices; improved, assured access to markels for Latin American exports; more
reasonable interest rates and fees; and negoliation of a conunon moratorium wilh a11 Latin
American countries banding togelher, admiuing a joint struclural probIem, with a substantial grace
period of 6 to 10 years wilhout any amortization payments. Anolher similarily is that the concept
of non-repudiation and respect for legal conlracts also remains. Latin American nalions say they
have been forced to suspend debl paymenls due to lack of funds, nOl lack of desire to pay.
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The structure of the debt is a major difference between the current crisis and the 1930' s, as
is the presence of the IMF. Bankers were relatively unconcemed in the 1930's, as they held few
of the bonds and had already made their profits. The small bondholders were not organized and
did not have the expertise or political c10ut to enforce a quick solution. The bankers now have
their survival at stake. They also have an intemational structure, including the IMF, which
reenforces their power and the terms of the renegotiated agreements.
Another difference is that all the Latin American nations are m approximately the same
precarious condition, whereas in 1933 Argentina enjoyed a substantially higher credit rating than
the other countries with debt, and Venezuela had the distinction of having no external debt.
Although Colombia in the 1980s is in a better position economically, it too has suffered in
international credit markets as a result of the contagion effect (not to mention concern over the
societal and political effects of its principal (illegal) exports). The dominance of the United States
is continent-wide, with the European bankers having secondary importance. This may change in
the near fllture with the increased importance of Japan as an international creditor, but during
the early and mid-80s, no one can dispute that the U.S. banks and government set the tone and
pace of the discussion and agreements on the debt topic.
The similarity of the analysis of the current debt problem with that of the 1930s is striking.
The Mexicans hoped that all their American neighbors would join in a frank discussion of the
problem of the time as well as a more philosophical discussion of credit. A moratorium was one
of many ideas which would have been discussed. In late 1982, Celso furtado suggested a
conference of the the major debtors "to define a cornmon doctrine, and the minimum acceptable
terms for a renegotiation," echoing the same idea.39 Several Latin American wide conferences
have been held in the early and mid-1980s inc1uding several meetings of the Consenso de
Cartegena and discussions on debt wiLhin SELA and the Group of Eight. However, the problems
with a joint approach remain as well, with the larger countries, with more relative power with
respect to the banks, not anxious to join in a continental group which would decrease their
individual power. Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico know that they have substantial power in
extracting favorable deals from the modem bankers' cornmittees, especially as quarter-ends
approach. These conferences have made proc1amations stressing the need for continued funding,
39"How the DebtOrs Can Forge a New Intemational Deal," South Magazine, December 1982,
pp. 65-66.
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understanding on the part of crcditors, and bcttcr tcrms for new loans; and against the
conditionality attached to the loans. Thcy havc requcstcd that crcditors not make dcmands to
transfer unrcasonable amounts abroad in thc form of debt service paymcnts and take ability to
pay into account. few dcbtor govcrnmcnts have raiscd basic philosophical objections to dcbt and
repaymcnt although groups of their constituents incrcasingly do so. The spirit of Sanchez Ponton
has not disappeared. As cconomic options continue to shrink, the political issues intcnsify.
The crisis in the 1930's caused Latin American governments to question the system of credit
and traditional economics. The 1980's crisis, via IMF programs requiring substantial sacrifices on
the part of a country as a whole, is causing the same qucstions to arise. If the fundamental
questions remain unaddrcssed this time we should not be surpriscd, indced we should cxpect, to
see traditional and espccially IMF stylc economics come under even more serious scrutiny and
rejection in part or in wholc.
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